ment would have been appropriate. Such incidents involved allegations of wrongdoing against a top assistant to a President, criminal conduct by a close associate and employee of a President prior to the time the President took office, and the investigation and prosecution of a sitting Vice President. Id. at 4219-20.
7 Taylor, "Meese Fits Attorney General Mold: Close Ties to the Chief," L.A. Daily J., Jan 31, 1984, at 4, col. 3 (The selection by Presidents of personal, business, or political associates as Attorneys General is common.)
8 Although on several occasions in American history, special prosecutors had been appointed to investigate alleged criminal misconduct by high-level Federal Government officials (e.g., the "whiskey ring" scandal of the Grant Administration and the "Teapot Dome" scandal of the Harding Administration), the most substantial interest in the creation of a permanent mechanism arose in the wake of the "Watergate" scandal.
The public first became aware of the Watergate scandal in late 1972. In the Spring of 1973, the Senate Judiciary Committee explored the need for a special prosecutor to investigate scattered reports of illegal actions by members of President Nixon's Administration. In response, President Nixon made a commitment to appoint such an investigator, and, on May 25, 1973, Attorney General Elliot Richardson chose Archibald Cox to perform this task. S. Rep. 170, supra note 5, at 2-3.
When in the course of his investigation, Mr. Cox insisted that the President release accounts of presidential conversations, the President ordered him removed, in what later became known as the "Saturday Night Massacre." After this firing, President Nixon argued that the investigation could be handled by the Department ofJustice. But the scandal, a time period in which Congress held extensive hearings and considered a plethora of proposed solutions. 9 This lengthy period of deliberation was necessary in part because of the constitutional problems presented by the creation of a law enforcement mechanism independent of the Executive Branch.' 0 In October of 1978, the Act was passed. I 1 As codified, the independent counsel provision, Title VI of the Act, applies only to senior officials of the executive branch, including the president, vice-president, and the cabinet. 12 It requires the attorney general to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of information suggesting that an included executive official has committed a serious federal crime. 13 Only information "sufficient to constitute grounds to investitheJudiciary Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives held extensive hearings on legislation to require the appointment of a temporary special prosecutor.
Faced with an enormous public outcry over the Cox firing and the rising probability of congressional action demanding such an appointment, President Nixon appointed Leon Jaworski as special prosecutor. Id.
In the spring of 1974, the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on proposed ways of removing political considerations from the administration of justice. Among the major conclusions drawn by the Subcommittee from these initial hearings was that, "No one who has watched 'Watergate' unfold can doubt that theJustice Department has difficulty investigating and prosecuting high officials, or that an independent prosecutor is freer to act according to politically neutral principles of fairness and justice." 9 Fifty-seven bills providing for a special prosecutor were introduced in the 93rd Congress alone. Cong. Index (CCH) 222 (1974) . In the 94th and 95th Congresses, twenty-five special prosecutor bills were introduced. See Brief for Appellants at Addendum A, Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Many legal scholars, members of the bar, present and former high officials, and other interested parties provided testimony before the congressional committees formulating special prosecutor legislation. See, e.g 10 Congressional committees considering legislation were "confronted with sharply conflicting testimony regarding the constitutionality of a special prosecutor whose appointment and removal were totally separated from the executive branch." S. REP 539, 540 (1988) ("The constitutionality of insulating prosecution from presidential control has been uncertain from the Act's inception.").
11 See supra note 2. 12 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (West Supp. 1988). 13 Id. at § 591 (a). This section states: "The Attorney General shall conduct a preliminary investigation.., whenever the Attorney General receives information sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether any person described in subsection (b) may have violated any Federal criminal law other than a violation classified as a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction." Id. gate" is required to warrant the appointment of an independent counsel.1 4 In determining whether such grounds exist, "the Attorney General shall consider only the specificity of the information received; 15 and the credibility of the source of the information."' 6 If, after preliminary investigation, the Attorney General determines that "there are reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted," he or she must apply to a Special Division of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for the appointment of an independent counsel. 1 7 Conversely, if the Attorney General concludes that there are "no reasonable grounds" to warrant further investigation, the case is terminated.' 8 Although a decision not to continue the investigation is not subject to judicial review,' 9 the Attorney General is required upon such a determination to present the Special Division with "a summary of the information received and a summary of the results of the preliminary investigation. ' ' 2 0 An appointment of an independent counsel may also be requested by members of Congress. The Attorney General must then determine whether such an appointment is necessary and if not, he must "submit a report ... stating the reasons why such an application was not made, addressing each matter with respect to which the congressional request was made." 2 1
The Ethics in Government Act directs the Special Division of the Court of Appeals to appoint the independent counsel and to define the scope of his or her jurisdiction to include subjects speci- 14 Id. 15 
Id. at § 591 (d)(1)(A). 16 Id. at § 591 (d)(1)(B).
17 Id. at § 592 (c)(1)(A). Also, under § 592(c)(1)(B), the Attorney General shall apply for such an appointment if the three month time period generally allotted for the preliminary investigation passes and the Attorney General "has not filed notification with the division of the court" that further investigation is not warranted. See Id. § 592(b)(1).
18 Id. at § 592(b)(1). This section states: "The Attorney General shall notify the Special Division of this decision," id. and "such notification shall contain a summary of the information received and a summary of the results of the preliminary investigation." Id. at § 592(b)(2).
19 The non-review section of the statute states: "The Attorney General's determination under this chapter to apply to the division of the court for the appointment of an independent counsel shall not be reviewable in any court." Id. at § 592(f). Although from the language of the statute it is not clear that this includes a determination by the Attorney General not to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel, the Morrison majority interpreted it as such: "'the courts are specifically prevented from reviewing the Attorney General's decision not to seek appointment. § 592(f)," Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2621. Justice Scalia reached a similar conclusion in his dissent, although his was based on a different rationale. See id. at 2625 n.1. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 20 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988 ). 21 Id. at § 5 9 2 (g)(3).
fled in the Attorney General's application, as well-as related matters. 22 This jurisdiction may be expanded upon request by the Attorney General, 2 3 either on his own initiative or in response to an evaluation of information discovered and submitted by the independent counsel. 24 Upon appointment, the independent counsel receives the full investigative and prosecutorial powers of the Department ofJustice, 2 5 whose policies respecting enforcement of the criminal laws he or she must follow "except where not possible." 2 6 In addition to this broad endowment of prosecutorial power, further specific powers are conferred upon the independent counsel by the Act.
7
The Attorney General's decision to remove the counsel "for good cause" 28 is subject to judicial review. 29 The Special Division 22 Id. at § 593(b)(1-3). 23 Id. at § 593(c)(1). 24 Id. at § 593(c)(2)(A)-(C), § 594(e). In evaluating whether information discovered by the independent counsel warrants an expansion of his or her jurisdiction, the Attorney General shall "accord[] great weight to the recommendations of the independent counsel." Id. at § 594(e). 25 Id. at § 594(a). 26 Id. at § 594(0. 27 Id. at § 594(a)(l)-(10). These powers include: Such investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers shall include-(1) conducting proceedings before grand juries and other investigations; (2) participating in court proceedings and engaging in any litigation, including civil and criminal matters, that such independent counsel considers necessary; (3) appealing any decision of a court in any case or proceeding in which such independent counsel participates in an official capacity;
(4) reviewing all documentary evidence available from any source; (5) determining whether to contest the assertion of any testimonial privilege; (6) receiving appropriate national security clearances and, if necessary, contesting in court . . . any claim of privilege or attempt to withhold evidence on grounds of national security; (7) making applications to any Federal court for a grant of immunity to any witness, consistent with applicable statutory requirements, or for warrants, subpoenas, or other court orders, and, for purposes of sections 6003, 6004, and 6005 of title 18, exercising the authority vested in a United States attorney or the Attorney General;
(8) inspecting, obtaining, or using the original or a copy of any tax return, in accordance with the applicable statutes and regulations, and, for purposes of section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the regulations issued thereunder, exercising the powers vested in a United States attorney or the Attorney General;
(9) initiating and conducting prosecutions in any court of competent jurisdiction, framing and signing indictments, filing informations, and handling all aspects of any case, in the name of the United States; and (10) consulting with the United States attorney for the district in which any violation of law with respect to which the independent counsel is appointed was alleged to have occurred.
Id.
28 Id. at § 596(a)(1). Besides good cause, the Attorney General may remove for reasons of "physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties. " Id. may terminate the office on grounds that the investigation has been "substantially completed," 3 0 and the counsel him or herself may terminate his or her office on the same grounds.
31
Congress retains "oversight jurisdiction with respect to the official conduct of any independent counsel .... and such independent counsel [has] the duty to cooperate with the exercise of such oversight jurisdiction." ' 32 The independent counsel must advise the House of Representatives of any "substantial and credible information" he or she receives which may constitute grounds for an impeachment of an Executive officer. 3 3 Congress also retains supervisory authority over the conduct of the Attorney General, who must provide upon congressional request information regarding any case arising under the independent counsel provision. 34 
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 1982, two subcommittees of the House of Representatives requested the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to provide them with internal agency documents relating to the efforts of the EPA and the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department ofJustice ("DOJ") to clean up hazardous waste sites as required by the "Superfund Law." ' 35 Under direction from the DOJ, the EPA complied partially with the subcommittee request, but withheld certain documents, claiming that congressional access to such sensitive materials would interfere with law enforcement efforts. 29 Id. at § 596(a)(3). "An independent counsel removed from office may obtain judicial review of the removal in a civil action.... The independent counsel may be reinstated or granted other appropriate relief by order of the court." Id. (1) When the information about the case was received.
(2) Whether a preliminary investigation is being conducted, and if so, the date it began.
(3) Whether an application for the appointment of an independent counsel or a notification that further investigation is not warranted has been filed with the division of the court, and if so, the date of such filing. After attempts for a negotiated compromise between the two branches failed, the House subcommittees issued subpoenas to the EPA Administrator, ordering compliance with the earlier request.
3 7
At that time, appellee Theodore B. Olson was the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel; appellee Edward C. Schmults was Deputy Attorney General; and appellee Carol E. Dinkins was the Assistant Attorney General for the Land and Natural Resources Division.
38
Acting on the advice of the DOJ, the President ordered the Administrator of the EPA to invoke executive privilege and refuse to comply with the subpoenas. 39 The House of Representatives responded by citing the Administrator for contempt, after which the Administrator and the United States together filed a lawsuit against the House. 40 In March of 1983, the conflict abated as the Administrator and the two subcommittees reached an agreement providing limited access to the documents. Concurrent to this series of events, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee had begun an investigation into the involvement of DOJ in the EPA document controversy. 4 2 As part of that investigation, Assistant Attorney General Olson testified before the subcommittee on March 10, 1983. 4 3 Both before and after that testimony, DOJ complied with several requests from this subcommittee to produce certain documents related to the EPA dispute. At the completion of the investigation, the HouseJudiciary Committee issued a lengthy report, over the vigorous dissent of its minority party members. 45 The report criticized various DOJ officials for their actions in the EPA executive privilege dispute. 4 
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Committee, thus obstructing its investigation. 4 7 The Committee Chairman forwarded a copy of the report to the Attorney General with a request, pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act's independent counsel provision, 48 that an independent counsel be appointed to investigate the allegations.
9
The Attorney General directed the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division to conduct a preliminary investigation. 50 The Section's report concluded that the appointment of an independent counsel was warranted to investigate all three appellees. 5 1 After consulting with other DOJ officials, the Attorney General chose to apply to the Special Division for the appointment of an independent counsel with respect to Olson only. In November of 1986, Morrison applied to the Attorney General for expanded jurisdiction to probe as "related matters" the Judiciary Committee's allegations against Schmults and Dinkins. 5s In particular, Morrison wanted to investigate "whether Mr. Olson's testimony was part of a larger, concerted plan, including Mr. Schmults, Ms. Dinkins, or others, to obstruct or impede the Committee's investigation . . .possibly in violation of federal criminal law." 59 The Attorney General refused the application because his initial investigation of the Committee's allegations had " 'found no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation of the Committee's allegations is warranted,'" specifically including any criminal conspiracy among the appellees. 6 0 Morrison then appealed to the Special Court to order that her jurisdiction be expanded. 6 1 On April 2, 1987, the Division ruled that the Attorney General's initial decision not to seek appointment of an independent counsel with regard to Schmults and Dinkins was final and unreviewable, and thus the Special Court had no authority to grant the appellant's request. 62 The court ruled, however, that "authority to investigate allegations and evidence that Theodore Olson was engaged in an unlawful conspiracy with others" was implicit in its original grant of jurisdiction, so that inquiry into the allegations against Schmults and Dinkins was permissible. counsel caused a grand jury to issue subpoenas on the appellees. 64 All three appellees moved to quash the subpoenas on the ground that the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act were unconstitutional. 6 5 On July 20, 1987, the district court upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 66 In order to pursue their challenge to the Act on appeal, the appellees refused to comply with the subpoenas, and were held in contempt of the district court. 6 7 The court, however, stayed the effect of its contempt orders pending an expedited appeal.
6 8
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit voted two to one to reverse. 69 The court held that an independent counsel is not an "inferior Officer" of the United States in the context of the "Appointments Clause" 70 of the Constitution:
[W]e think the independent counsel's authority is so broad as to compel the conclusion that she is a principal officer and therefore her appointment by the Special Court is unconstitutional. After all, the independent counsel's authority is-at least with respect to any matter within her jurisdiction-broader even than the Attorney General's...
[T]he independent counsel has authority unchecked by the President himself to decide that an investigation shall continue and that a prosecution shall be initiated.
Therefore, the court of appeals ruled that the Act was unconstitutional because it does not provide for the independent counsel to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, as is required by the clause 72 for the appointment of "principal" officers.
73
The court further stated that, even if it is assumed arguendo that the independent counsel is an inferior officer, the Act is uncon- 74 First, according to the court, the Act also violates the appointments clause by empowering a court of law to appoint an inferior officer who performs "core" executive functions: "A statute that vests the appointment of an officer who prosecutes the criminal law in some branch other than the executive obstructs the President's ability to execute the law-a duty the President can practically carry out only through appointed officials." 75 "
Second, the court of appeals said, the Act violates the President's constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are "faithfully executed" 76 by imposing a "good cause" limitation on the independent counsel's removal, 7 7 delegating to a "Special Court" the authority to review the dismissal of an independent counsel by the Attorney General, 78 and empowering the Special Court to appoint an interim independent counsel and to reinstate a dismissed independent counsel. 79 Third, the court concluded that, notwithstanding Morrison's contention that history demonstrates that Presidents cannot be trusted to ensure that their senior appointed officials obey the criminal laws, "the Act viewed as a whole, taking into account its appointment, removal, and supervisory provisions, so deeply invades the President's executive prerogatives and responsibilities and so jeopardizes individual liberty as to be unconstitutional." court, "preserves an independent and neutral judiciary, relatively removed from decisions and activities of the other two branches. ' 8 4 The Ethics in Government Act involves the Special Division not only in the appointment process but in the non-article III function of monitoring the day-to-day activities of an Executive Branch official as well. 85 Thus, the court held the provision unconstitutional.
6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act violates the appointments clause of the Constitution, 8 7 exceeds the article III limitations on judicial power, 88 or impermissibly interferes with the President's executive authority as granted by article 1189 so as to violate the consitutional principle of separation of powers. 90 
IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decisions and held that the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act are constitutional. 9 1 ChiefJustice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion. 92 ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that central to the determination of the Act's constitutionality was the position of the independent counsel within the executive branch hierarchy as either a principal or an inferior officer. 93 The principal/inferior delineation was cru- 84 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 512. 85 See supra notes 18-20, 29. 86 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 511-17. 87 See supra note 70. 88 See supra note 8 1. 89 See supra note 76. 
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cial to the appellate court's invalidation of the Act. 94 The Ethics in Government Act allows for appointment of the independent counsel through the shortened process available for inferior officers. 95 Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "[t]he initial question is ... whether appellant is an 'inferior' or a 'principal' officer. If she is the latter.., then the Act is in violation of the Appointments Clause. ' 96 The majority found sufficient statutory limitations on the office of independent counsel to qualify it as an inferior officer. 9 7 Despite a certain degree of independence from the President and Attorney General, the Court noted that the Attorney General retains the power to remove the counsel. 9 8 Also, the Court found that the limited tenure, jurisdiction, and duties of the independent counsel indicated its inferior status. 9 9 Consequently, under United States v. Germaine,°0 0 which considered the "ideas of tenure, duration.... and duties" as determinative of whether the officer is a principal or an inferior, the Court concluded that the independent counsel is an inferior official. 1 1
The Court went on to address Olson's alternative contention that, even assuming that the independent counsel is an inferior officer, the appointments clause does not empower Congress to create an interbranch appointment scheme. Olson had argued that the vesting of the power to choose the inferior officer in a body outside the Executive Branch, such as the Special Division, is unconstitutional as contravening the meaning of the appointments clause.' 0 2
The Court rejected this argument on three grounds. First, according to the Court, the language of the excepting provision in the appointments clause indicated no limitation on interbranch appointments in the manner for which Olson argued. 104 Rather, the Court said that the language seemed to allow Congress (Otto) at 511). As further authority for this conclusion, the Court cited United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898)("vice counsel" appointed in the interim of the absence of the consul, a principal officer, is not himself a principal officer because he "is charged with the performance of the duty of the superior for a limited time and under special and temporary conditions."). 102 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2609-10.
103
Id. 104 Id. at 2610.
significant discretion in the vesting of appointment power.' 0 5 Second, the Court found nothing in the intent of the Framers to imply such a prohibition not found in the Clause's express language.
1 0 6
Third, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the appointment process of the independent counsel provision conformed with the limits the Court had previously set on interbranch appointments.' 0 7 The Court cited the test for the propriety of an interbranch appointment of inferior officers it had established in Ex parte Siebold, 10 8 in which it rejected a strict separation of powers.' 0 9 The Siebold Court stated that without evidence of "incongruity" between the constitutionally mandated duties of the branch and the additional duty to appoint imposed upon it, an interbranch appointment process was valid. 10 Similarly, the Morrison Court did not find any inherent incongruity in a specially created federal court having the power to appoint prosecutorial officers."'I The majority cited as precedent Furthermore, the Court noted, the office of independent counsel arose precisely because Congress believed and events demonstrated that the Executive Branch could not be wholly entrusted with the duty of investigating itself. Thus, if for no other reason than by a process of elimination (as Congressional appointment of the independent counsel would be clear self-aggrandizement), the duty was vested in the judiciary." 108 100 U.S. (10 Otto.) 371 (1880). In Siebold, the Court upheld a statute placing appointment of federal election supervisors in the courts. The Court in that case reasoned, "[t]he duty to appoint inferior officers, when required thereto by law, is a constitutional duty of the courts; and in the present case there is no such incongruity in the duty required as to excuse the court from its performance, or to render their acts void." Id. at 398 (emphasis added). Regarding the-various administrative duties granted to the Special Division which were not incidental to the duty of appointment, the Court replied, "[w]e do not think that Article III absolutely prevents Congress from vesting these other miscellaneous powers in the Special Division pursuant to the Act."' 124 The Court said that a primary purpose of the separation of executive and administrative functions from the courts is to prevent the judicial assumption of duties that either the Executive or the Legislature could accomplish more properly. 12 5 Consequently, the Court saw no real encroachment on the proper functions of the other two branches because 
1988]
many of the Special Division's powers were passive, 1 2 6 or analogous to the established functions of federal judges in other contexts 2 7
and not inherently "core" executive functions.
128
Commenting on the Special Division's power to remove the independent counsel under section 596(b)(2) of the Ethics in Government Act, the Court admitted that this authority was atypical of usual judicial responsibilities and tended more towards the category of administrative duties. 129 Yet, it once more found no significant encroachment upon Executive power or the independent counsel's prosecutorial discretion. 130 Construing Section 596(b)(2) narrowly, the Court stated:
The termination provisions of the Act do not give the Special Division anything approaching the power to remove the counsel while an investigation or court proceeding is still underway-this power is vested solely in the Attorney General. As we see it, "termination" may occur only when the duties of the counsel are truly "completed" or "so substantially completed" that there remains no need for any continuing action by the independent counsel.' 3 '
The Court found the exercise of this power valid in the rare situation in which an independent counsel obstinately and without authority attempted to continue her investigation beyond the completion of her original function. Finally, the Court rejected the article III contentions of appellees that the Special Division's involvement in the early stages of an investigation under the Ethics Act threatened the fair and impartial adjudication of any claims brought later by the independent counsel.' 33 The Court said that the Act sufficiently isolates the Special Division by giving it no power to review any actions of the counsel or the Attorney General with regard to the counsel, as well as providing a general prohibition on any of its judges from participating in any judicial proceeding involving an independent counsel.1 3 4
After this discussion of article III issues, the majority concluded 126 Id. The Court provided as an example the receipt of reports from the Attorney General and the independent counsel but no power to act upon them. The Act, the Court noted, prohibits members of the Special Division from participating in "any judicial proceeding concerning a matter which involves such independent counsel while such independent counsel is serving in that office of which involves the exercise of such independent counsel's official duties, regardless of whether
968
[Vol. 79 its opinion by examining the validity of the Act in light of the constitutionally implied principle of a separation of governmental powers. 1 3 5 The Court inquired as to whether the good cause restriction on the power of removal by the Attorney General, or more generally, the Act as a whole, impermissibly interfered with the President's duty to control prosecution by the federal government.'
The Court said that the Act was not an attempt by Congress to gain for itself more power at the expense of power lost by the President. 1 3 7 The Act did not provide a greater ability for Congress to remove executive officers, said the Court, because Congress can do so only through its constitutional endowment of the power to impeach and convict. 1 3 8 Instead, the Court ruled, the removal of the independent counsel is vested primarily in the Executive Branch itself, in the office of Attorney General. 39 In this way, the Court reasoned, the independent counsel process of the Act was clearly distinguishable from the earlier approaches struck down in Unlike the situations of those cases, the Morrison Court found that no power of removal devolved onto Congress under the Ethics in Government Act. 14 2 Rather, said the Court, "the Act puts the removal power squarely in the hands of the Executive Branch" and no congressional approval is necessary.'
The Court considered the propriety of the Act's placement of a such independent counsel is still serving in that office." 28 U.S.C. § 49() ( 
S. 52 (1926). At issue in
Myers was a statute providing that certain postmasters could be removed only "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." The President had removed one such postmaster without Senate approval, and the Senate challenged this action in court. The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional because it permitted Congress to "draw to itself.., the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power. To do this would be to go beyond the words and implications of the [appointments clause] and to infringe the constitutional principle of the separation of governmental powers." Id. at 161.
141 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Six decades after Myers, the Bowsher Court based its invalidation of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act on that decision. The later situation similarly involved the statutory authorization of a government official, the Comptroller General, who was removable only by Congress, to participate in the "executive powers" of budget implementation. There, the Court ruled that "Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment." Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726. See infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text for further discussion of Bowsher. 142 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2616. 143 Id.
"good cause" requirement on the Attorney General, instead of allowing for removal at will. 14 4 The Court stated that the validity of such a requirement is not based on whether the Court classifies the official in question (here, the independent counsel) as a "purely executive" functionary. 45 Such a basis, said the Court, would require the Court to define rigid classes of officials removable and not removable at will.
14 6 Rather, according to the Court, the intent in the analysis of removal cases is to ensure that the Legislative Branch does not unduly intrude on the Executive's discharge of his constitutionally-appointed duties. 1 4 7 The majority relied upon the characterization of certain governmental duties as "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-legislative," as shown in 148 295 U.S. 602 (1935). In Humphrey's Executor, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute limiting the President's power to remove commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission to situations of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Id. at 619. The Court held that the President did not have illimitable removal power over officials whose functions were not purely executive because such functioning required a degree of freedom from executive interference: "For it is quite evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's will." Id. at 629. Thus, because the FTC's duties included primarily quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, the commissioner was not "purely executive" and executive removal of such an officer could be limited. Those whose functions are "purely executive" are "merely one of the units in the executive department and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid [he or she) is." Id. In short, Humphrey's Executor established the following test: "Whether the power of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power by ... precluding a removal except for cause will depend upon the character of the office." Id. at 631.
149 357 U.S. 349 (1958). The Humiphrev's Executor test was applied in lWiener. The issue was whether the President had unlimited discretion in the removal of a member of the War Claims Commission, created by the War Claims Act, 62 Stat. 1240 (1948) . There the Court also found "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" powers possessed by the official and thus the President's removal authority was susceptible to restriction. lliener, 357 U.S. at 354-55.
970
[Vol. 79 the official in question must be analyzed in that light.' 50 Given the limitations on the office of independent counsel, the President's need to control such an officer to maintain the functioning of the Executive Branch, said the Court, did not extend to the ability to terminate the counsel at will. 15 1 The majority found that the removal limitation ensured the necessary degree of independence without impermissibly intruding on presidential duties.
2
The majority's final consideration was "whether the Act, taken as a whole, violates the principle of separation of powers by unduly interfering with the role of the Executive Branch."' 153 The Court balanced the value of a separation of powers, emphasized in Buckley as " 'a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other,' "154 against the pragmatic view espoused by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer: 15 5 "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." 1 56 The Court found the latter approach appropriate in evaluating the Ethics in Government Act. The Court stated that, unlike the Bowsher situation, the Act attempts no legislative usurpation of executive functions because Congress' role under the Act is limited. 5 8 Although its members may request the Attorney General to apply to the Special Division for appointment of an independent counsel, the Court said that the Attorney General is not required to comply under the language of the Act. 159 Beyond this power to request, said the Court, the Act grants to Congress the power to oversee the counsel's activities' 6 0 and to receive reports generated by the investigation from the counsel. 16 generally as being incidental" to Congress' legislative function. 162 Similarly, the Act did not empower the Judiciary at the expense of the Executive because the Special Division must rely on the initiative of the Attorney General to become involved in the execution of the Act. 16 3 Finally, the Court found no impermissible undermining or blockage of the exercise of executive duties. 16 4 Although recognizing that "[i]t is undeniable that the Act reduces the amount of control or supervision that the Attorney General and, through him, the President exercises over the investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity," the Court noted that the Act also gave the Attorney General several means of controlling an investigation by an independent counsel.' 6 5 Most important of these means are the powers of appointment application and good cause removal.' 6 6 Consequently, the Court voted to uphold the constitutionality of the independent counsel provision.' 67 V. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT Justice Scalia viewed the majority's opinion as incomplete and overly reliant on a technical interpretation of the independent counsel provision.1 68 The incompleteness of the majority's approach was due, he argued, to the insufficient attention it gave to the separation of powers issue: "The Court devotes most of its attention to such relatively technical details as the Appointments Clause and the removal power, addressing briefly and only at the end of its opinion, the separation of powers ... I think that has it backwards."' 69 Justice Scalia argued that the separation of powers issue dominates the case because it arose out of a direct confrontation between the President and the Congress. 170 The struggle for political power is its fundamental theme, said Justice Scalia: "That is what this suit is about. Power."" 7 1 Justice Scalia noted that a concentration of power in the legislative branch had been foreseen by the Framers, [Vol. 79
and they subsequently took measures to guard against such an imbalance: But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconvenience is to divide the legislature into different branches.... As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. '
72
Justice Scalia concluded that these measures must be reinforced.
173
Such fortification was accomplished in part by the creation of a single, unitary President in whom, as Justice Scalia described, all executive power was vested.
174
Justice Scalia began his dissent with the assertion that, under Article II, section 1, clause 1 of the Constitution, all of the executive power shall be vested in the President. 7 5 Because "[g]overnmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function,"' 7 6 and the Ethics in Government Act deprives the President of exclusive control over the exercise of that power by creating a prosecutor over whom he has little supervision, the Act impermissibly blurs the separation of powers.' 77 Justice Scalia argued that the independent counsel is not susceptible to the normal considerations that govern the execution of prosecutorial power. Rather, Justice Scalia said, the counsel is focused solely on the prosecution of the object of her investigation. 78 The danger of this untempered single-mindedness, Justice Scalia stated, was illustrated by the decision of the independent counsel in a different investigation to subpoena the Ambassador of Canada, an act that caused considerable strain in American relations with that country. 179 Such an attempt to breach diplomatic immunity, if un- dertaken by the Department of Justice, would have been squelched in light of the President's article II, section 2 foreign policy responsibilities, said justice Scalia.'1 8 0 As a consequence of the unique, single-focus aspect of the independent counsel, Justice Scalia argued, "the balancing of various legal, practical, and political considerations ... [which) is the very essence of prosecutorial discretion" is not carried out:' 8 ' "To take this away is to remove the core of the prosecutorial function, and not merely 'some' presidential control."1 8 2 Justice Scalia's construction of the actual extent of the Attorney General's powers under the Act diverged sharply from that of the majority. Regarding the Attorney General's discretion in applying for the appointment of an independent counsel after a request to do so, Justice Scalia stated:
As a practical matter, it would be surprising if the Attorney General had any choice.., but to seek appointment of an independent counsel to pursue the charges against the principal object of the congressional request.... Merely the political consequences (to him and the President) of seeming to break the law by refusing to do so would have been substantial. How could it not be, the public would ask, that a 3,000-page indictment drawn by our representatives over 2 1/2 years does not even establish "reasonable grounds to believe" that further investigation or prosecution is warranted with respect to at least the principal alleged culprit?
18 3
Similarly, though there is no judicial review of the Attorney General's refusal to seek appointment, Congress may review it, also narrowing the Attorney General's discretion: "the context of this statute is acrid with the smell of threatened impeachment."' ' 84 Justice Scalia assailed the majority for endorsing a balancing test to make separation of powers determinations, rather than the "clear constitutional prescription" that the executive power belongs exclusively to the President. 8 5 In doing so, the majority gave no criteria for deciding when a curtailing of executive power by a statute produces an imbalance that renders it unconstitutional:
The most amazing feature of the Court's opinion is that... [ whether to investigate and prosecute the President's closest advisors, and indeed the President himself, is not "so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch" as to be constitutionally required to be within the President's control. Apparently that is so because we say it is so.
8 6
By not devising "a substitute criterion-a 'justiciable standard' " for measuring the permissibility of statutory intrusions into the power of the President, Justice Scalia argued that the majority makes inevitable an "ad hoc approach to constitutional adjudication" in which such potentially intrusive legislation will be drawn with little precedential restriction.1 8 7
Accordingly, Justice Scalia stated, the political limitations of the Attorney General's powers under the Act means that the functions of the Executive Branch will be impaired by an erosion of leverage to implement its policies.1 8 8
Regarding "the President's high-level assistants, who typically have no political base of support," Scalia stated, "it is . . . utterly unrealistic to think that they will not be intimidated by this prospect [of prosecution by an independent counsel], and that their advice to him and their advocacy of his interests before a hostile Congress will not be affected."' 8 9 Furthermore, Justice Scalia asserted:
Besides weakening the Presidency by reducing the zeal of his staff, it must also be obvious that the institution of the independent counsel enfeebles him more directly in his constant confrontations with Congress, by eroding his public support. Nothing is so politically effective as the ability to charge that one's opponent and his associate are not merely wrong-headed, naive, ineffective, but, in all probability, "crooks." And nothing so effectively gives an appearance of validity to such charges as a Justice Department investigation and, even better prosecution.1 9 0 Thus, he stated, the Act indirectly produces an imbalance of political power tilting in favor of the Legislative Branch.' 9 '
Justice Scalia faulted the majority for not attempting "to 'decide exactly' what established the line between principal and 'inferior' officers."' 9 2 Justice Scalia blasted its conclusion that the independent counsel is an inferior officer based on the statement cited from Germaine that "the term [officer] embraces the ideas of tenure, dura-SUPREME COURT REVIEW tion, emolument, and duties."' 193 Although she may be removed for "good cause" by the Attorney General, Justice Scalia said, "most (if not all) principal officers in the Executive Branch may be removed by the President at will." 194 Thus, removal of the independent counsel is more difficult than removal of most principal officers, which would indicate a non-inferior status. 9 5 The majority mischaracterized the independent counsel's authority as "limited," he said.' 9 6
Rather, Justice Scalia argued, the Act delegates to the appellant the "full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice," as well as a range of specific powers. 1 97 Finally, Justice Scalia remained unpersuaded by the majority's contention that the nature of the tenure and jurisdiction of the independent counsel made her an inferior officer.' 9 8 Regarding tenure, he said, "[U]nlike most high-ranking Executive Branch officials, [the independent counsel] continues to serve until she (or the Special Division) decides that her work is substantially completed."' 9 9 The appellant, he noted, had already served two years, not an insubstantial time period. 2 0 0 The fact that appellant's investigation was focused did not make it insignificant, according to Justice Scalia. 20 '
Evidence of this is the enormous amount of attention focused on the Morrison case, as well as the other independent counsel investigations.
2
Justice Scalia argued that a better basis for deciding the status of an Executive officer than that provided by the Germaine dictum is the division of powc.rs as established by the Constitution. 
976
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ing clause, 20 5 and the "admittedly sketchy precedent in this area" 20 6 led Justice Scalia to the conclusion that although not the sole sufficient reason, "it is surely a necessary condition for inferior officer status that the officer be subordinate to another officer." 20 7 The independent counsel is not, however, subordinate to another officer; as the majority admits, Justice Scalia noted, "[a]ppellant may not be 'subordinate' to the Attorney General (and the President) insofar as she possesses a degree of independent discretion to exercise the powers delegated to her under the Act." 20 8 When operating within the confines of her statutory powers, the independent counsel is subordinate to no one, "not even.. the President." 20 9
Therefore, Justice Scalia stated, the appellant is not an inferior officer, and her appointment as provided for in the Act, which does not involve the President and Senate, is unconstitutional.
10
Justice Scalia predicted an effective eradication of precedent by the majority's decision regarding the removal of executive officers. 2 11 Before Morrison, said Justice Scalia, precedent established that the President's power to remove principal officers who performed purely executive duties could not be limited. 2 12 His power to remove inferior officers who perform purely executive duties and whose appointment Congress had removed from the appointment clause process of presidential nomination and Senate approval and consent could be restricted, said Justice Scalia, at least when an Executive officer made the appointment. 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW restrictions on the President's power to remove inferior officers appointed by the judiciary. 21 4 The sole consideration for doing so, stated Justice Scalia, is that Congress does not "interfere with the President's exercise of the 'executive power' and his constitutionally appointed duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. ' 21 5 With this extension, Justice Scalia argued, the Court "swept into the dustbin of repudiated constitutional principles" the standard of Humphrey's Executor which evaluated the inferior official's duties as "purely executive," "quasi-legislative," or "quasi-judicial." 2 16
Although Justice Scalia readily admitted that such distinctions are not "clear nor even . . .rational .. .at least [they] permitted the identification of certain officers and certain agencies, whose functions were entirely within the control of the President."
2 17
According to Justice Scalia, the Morrison holding will allow the restriction of the removal of any Executive officer, provided that the President remains "able to accomplish his constitutional role." 2 18 This vague and expansive standard is "an open invitation" for Congress to intrude upon the President's duties. 2 19 Although the Court retains the ultimate authority to evaluate the permissibility of such intrusions, Justice Scalia stated that the President should be able to protect his own branch and the inability to do so creates a severe. imbalance between the branches. 220 The test illustrated perfectly Justice Scalia's primary contention in his dissent that the majority failed to understand the operation of the hydraulic pressures of a separation of powers, in which "'[a]mbition . . . counteract[s] ambition.' "221 Justice Scalia concluded his dissent with an examination of the fairness of the prosecutorial process created by the Act upon those executive officials who become the targets of an investigation. The dangerous potential of the unfettered prosecutor was described by Justice Robert Jackson, whom Justice Scalia quoted at length, when he was Attorney General under President Franklin Roosevelt, in a speech to United States Attorneys:
With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecu- 
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[Vol. 79 tor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone. In such a case, it is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then searching the law books, or putting investigators to work to pin some offense on him. It is in this realm-in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor himself.
22 2
The main guard against this potential for abuse, Justice Scalia argued, is the political accountability of the President, who appoints and removes federal prosecutors: "when crimes are not investigated and prosecuted fairly, nonselectively, with a reasonable sense of proportion, the President pays the cost in political damage to his administration." 2 23 According to Justice Scalia, however, the position of independent counsel was designed to operate largely independent and uninfluenced by the President, so this check is not present: "even if it were entirely evident that unfairness was in fact Justice Scalia recognized that "[tihe purpose of the separation and equilibrium of powers, in general, and of the unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to assure effective government but to preserve individual freedom. ' 22 7 This freedom is not waived upon the assumption of one of the Executive Branch offices covered by the Ethics in Government Act, and those officials are entitled to the same fair treatment under the law as is accorded those not subject to the Act. 2 28 By dividing the primary functions of government among several distinct branches, the Framers sought to avoid a concentration of power through which a democratic republic might become ripe for tyrannical rule. Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu's thesis that checks and balances were the foundation of a structure of government that would protect liberty. The Framers provided a vigorous legislative branch and a separate and wholly independent executive branch, with each branch responsible ultimately to the people. 23 '
Although it would be premature to argue that in upholding the validity of the independent counsel, the Morrison majority placed the federal government on a slippery slope toward tyranny, 23 2 it is true that the absence of an institutional framework of checks and balances within which prosecutorial discretion is normally exercised encourages abuses of the rights of individuals subject to Ethics in 227 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 228 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) . 229 Thus, the Republic enters a new phase. Congress has created, and the Court here sanctioned, a mechanism through which the losers of intramural policy debates will increasingly find themselves facing not merely political reprisal, nor even career ending or retarding retribution, but criminal investigation. Congress and the Court have created a monstrous tool for tyranny. From the vantage point of decades hence, Morrison will be viewed as the decision in this decade most destructive of liberty and the rule of law.
Government Act investigations. 23 3 Lost in the placement of the criminal prosecution function outside of the Executive Branch is the element of accountability, which serves as a check on the exercise of this function.
B. DIVERGENCE FROM THE RECENT SEPARATION OF POWERS

DECISIONS
Morrison diverged from the decisions rendered by the Court in three recent landmark cases centered on the separation of powers issue. In Buckley v. Valeo, 23 4 the Court refused to allow Congress to appoint what it deemed to be executive officers. 23 5 In 1974, Congress had amended the Federal Campaign Act to create an eightmember Federal Election Commission ("FEC"). 23 6 Two members were to be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, two were to be appointed by the Speaker of the House, two were to be appointed by the President, and the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House filled the last two positions as ex officio, nonvoting members. 23 7 The FEC exercised, inter alia, wide-ranging enforcement powers, which represented "the performance of a significant governmental duty... pursuant to a public law." 23 8 The Court held that "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States,' and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by [the appointments clause]." 23 9 The FEC's powers were not merely "of an Article III, § 1 serves both to protect "the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government" .... and to safeguard litigants' right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government." ... Although our cases have provided us with little occasion to discuss the nature or significance of this latter safeguard, our prior discussions of Article III, § I's guarantee of an independent and impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary of the United States intimated that this guarantee serves to protect primarily personal, rather than structural, interests. Id. at 837 (citations omitted). By analogy, this concern for individuals should at least have been a factor in the Court's determination of the validity of the independent prosecutor provision of the Ethics in Government Act. investigative and informative nature, falling in the same general category as those powers which Congress might delegate to one of its own committees. ' 240 Rather, the Commission had the authority to enforce the law: "A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress that the Constitution entrusts [this] responsibility. ' 24 1 Thus, Congress could not create a process under which it retained full oversight of the appointment of four members of the FEC.
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In INS v. Chadha, 243 the Court invalidated the legislative veto, by which Congress had sought to override executive action through means less formal than legislation. 2 44 In that case, the Attorney General had suspended an order of deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 24 5 A provision of that legislation allowed either House of Congress to pass a resolution blocking such suspension, 24 6 which the House of Representatives did against Chadha. The Court found the provision unconstitutional because it violated the presentment clause of article 1,247 which requires a bill to pass both houses and be presented to the President for his signature or veto before it becomes law. 248 In Bowsher v. Synar, 249 the Court prohibited an officer removable by Congress from performing an executive function. 250 Under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, 2 5 1 the Comptroller General was given the authority to make certain final decisions regarding the reductions required to balance the federal budget. Because the Comptroller General was subject to removal by Congress at any time, the Act was held to be unconstitutional. 247 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 248 Chadha, 426 U.S. at 946-947. The Court said, "'[the decision to provide the President with a limited and qualified power to nullify proposed legislation by veto was based on the profound conviction of the Framers that the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most carefully circumscribed." Id. 
Prior to Morrison, these precedents suggested that the Court would interpret the independent counsel provision as a dilution of presidential supervision over an executive function. 253 By upholding the constitutionality of the independent counsel law, however, the Court allowed for the placement of a significant, core executive function 25 4 in an entity operating largely unsupervised by the executive branch.
The "individual freedom" purpose of the separation of powers, as described by Justice Scalia, was more explicit in Morrison than in the other three cases. That is, Buckley, Chadha, and Bowsher focused exclusively on the structural division of powers between ambitious and competing branches as a means of ensuring effective government. 25 5 The protection of the individual from an overbearing government was not the immediate concern of the Court. In Morrison, the structural propriety of the independent prosecutor was considered and discussed at great length by the majority. 2 56 However, the added aspect of the threatened rights of persons such as Olson was considered by only Justice Scalia. 2 5 7 Because an individual is more directly and immediately threatened by an unchecked exercise of the power of criminal prosecution than by an unconstitutional appointment, legislative, or removal process, Morrison would seem to have any fashion found to be unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congressional control over laws, Chadha makes clear, is constitutionally impermissible." Id. 253 See, e.g., Carter, Halt to the Chief?, Legal Times, August 29, 1988, at 22, col. 1; Bruff, Special Prosecutor Case a Balancing Act, Legal Times, July 4, 1988, at 5, col. 1.
254 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976)("a lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for the breach of law, and it is to the President, not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' Art. II, § 3."). 255 In Buckley, the Court was concerned that the appointment by Congress alone of officials performing significant governmental duties as prescribed by law would create an imbalance of power between the branches. See supra notes 234-42 and accompanying text. In Chadha, the Court sought to maintain the constitutional division of "delegated powers of the... federal government into three defined categories ... to assure.., that each Branch... would confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919. Similarly, Bowsher cited this statement from Chadha in arriving at its holding that "once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly-by passing new legislation." Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733-34 (citation omitted). presented an even more compelling situation for securing the responsibilities of the Executive Branch than Buckley, Chadha, or Bowsher, the majority's meticulous validation of the Act's appointment and removal process notwithstanding. The majority's opinion did not consider the potential for prosecutorial abuse under the Act, despite the fact that such abuses had been a major argument against the validity of the independent counsel.
260 Those who supported the Act justified such incidents as the price that must be paid to ensure impartial investigations of the Executive Branch. 26 1 However, because the majority opinion barely mentioned the issue of the conflict of interest of an Attorney General which had necessitated creation of the independent counsel, 2 62 the gain for which this cost to an individual's rights is exchanged was not within the scope of its consideration. Thus, one of the difficult, fundamental determinations underlying the case-whether the assurance of impartial law enforcement envisioned by the Act is desirable in light of the unfairness to individuals that inevitably occurs because of the fervor of prosecution by an independent counsel-is left unreviewed by the majority's opinion.
Despite the Morrison Court's approach, the Court had recognized in a recent case that persons who become the targets of prolonged criminal investigations, even if ultimately exonerated, are subjected to extreme financial, emotional, and reputational burdens:
263 "even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching 258 See supra notes 137-52 and accompanying text. 264 Given that such disruption occurs in a normal criminal investigation, as was involved in that case, the experience is further enhanced by the intensity of an independent counsel's focused investigation. As Justice Scalia observed, "[h]ow frightening it must be to have your own independent counsel and staff appointed, with nothing else to do but to investigate you until investigation is no longer worthwhile-with whether it is worthwhile not depending upon what such judgments usually hinge on, competing responsibilities.
' 2 6 5
The abuses which occur under the independent counsel law generally do not rise to the level of due process violations, 26 6 which may occur once a criminal indictment has been obtained and a formal, judicial proceeding begun. Rather, such abuses have occurred before an independent counsel's investigation has produced sufficient grounds to warrant an indictment. 26 7 Although the courts have acknowledged authority to guard against abuses of the former type, a prosecutor still exercises wide discretion over a variety of matters which are not, and properly should not be, subject to judicial review. 268 Yet these decisions have great impact on the person 264 Id. at 2141. 265 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2640 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 266 Under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, "no person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," the former applying this requirement to the federal government, the latter to state governments. U.S. CONST.,amend. V, XIV. The requirement protects the individual'from overreaching by the government:
Tihe due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment-just as that in the Fifth-has led few to doubt that it was intended to guarantee procedural standards adequate and appropriate, then and thereafter, to protect, at all times, people charged with or suspected of crime by those holding positions of power and authority.... From the popular hatred and abhorrence of illegal confinement, torture and extortion of confessions of violations of the 'law of the land' evolved the fundamental idea that no man's life, liberty, or property be forfeited as criminal punishment for violation of that law until there has been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power. Thus, as assurance against ancient evils, our country, in order to preserve 'the blessings of liberty,' wrote into its basic law the requirement, among others, that the forfeiture of the lives, liberties or property of people accused of crime can only follow if procedural safeguards of due process have been obeyed. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-237 (1940)(footnotes omitted).
The due process requirement has led to prohibitions against, inter alia, overly vague criminal statutes, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), strict liability for common law offenses imposing severe penalties, Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), and criminal liability for an omission without proof that the defendant had knowledge of the law creating the duty to act, Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 267 See infra notes 276-81 and accompanying text. 268 See, e.g, Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) . The Court in Wayte stated:
In our criminal justice system, the Government retains "broad discretion" as to whom to prosecute ... This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as under investigation. 2 69 At the pre-indictment stage of a criminal investigation, the individual is protected against unfair treatment primarily by the checks on prosecutorial discretion.
70
The normal exercise of prosecutorial discretion occurs within a network of checks and balances. 2 7 ' Every federal prosecutor is accountable to a superior, with the President as the ultimate authority, who is in turn accountable to the people. 2 72 Furthermore, in the course of an investigation, a United States Attorney must consider the interests of other prosecutors, of law enforcement officials, and of officials outside of the Department of Justice. 2 73 It was the complete absence of this system of institutional safeguards in the office of independent counsel which caused three former Attorneys General to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals:
[T]he checks and balances ... guard against the dangers that are endemic in any government-not the dangers of corruption or gross abuse, which are rare, but the everyday danger that a prosecutor will become too close to a case and will lose perspective. The most admirable and dedicated prosecutor may exaggerate the importance of a case and underestimate its potential to interfere with other important government interests and with the lives of the individuals affected.
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the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Id. at 607-08. Wayte involved the prosecution of a young man eligible for the military draft who had written government officials stating that he had not registered with the Selective Service System and did not intend to do so. The Court held that the government's passive enforcement policy for draft avoiders, together with its efforts to persuade nonregistrants to comply, did not violate either the first or fifth amendments. Id. 269 As noted by ex-Attorneys General Levi, Bell, and Smith in their amicus curiae brief, "[Flor the individual whose privacy is invaded, whose affairs are disrupted, and who is subjected to extraordinary emotional distress, these [decisions by a federal prosecutor] are likely to be the most significant decisions that any government official ever makes." Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith, supra note 260, at 5. 270 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2137. The Young Court stated: A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such as the determination of which persons should be targets of investigations, what methods of investigation should be used, what information will be sought as evidence, which persons should be charged with what offenses, which persons should be utilized as witnesses, whether to enter into plea bargains and the terms on which they shall be established, and whether any individuals should be granted immunity. These decisions, critical to the conduct of a prosecution, are all made outside the supervision of the court."
Id.
271 Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith, supra note 260, at 8-9. See also Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2627-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272 Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith, supra note 260, at 8-9.
273 Id. 274 Id. at 9-10.
Furthermore, because of the political implications of a possible discovery of unethical behavior in the executive branch, great publicity inevitably accompanies the appointment of an independent counsel: "Thus, the separation of the Independent Counsel from the Executive Branch necessarily casts aside one of the most decent traditions of our criminal law system-the tradition that allegations of wrongdoing are not made public until a grand jury has found probable cause to believe them true." '275 Events subsequent to the Morrison decision have illustrated the potential for abuse of the subject of an independent counsel investigation. For example, in the Spring of 1988, Morrison informed O1-son that she would seek a protective indictment unless he agreed to waive the five-year statute of limitations on the case, which was due to expire on March 10. 276 In retrospect, as the investigation produced not even an indictment, such a motion would have clearly been improper and may have been merely a bluff on Morrison's part. 2 77 Opponents of the independent counsel law argued that Olson had no real choice but to acquiesce in Morrison's proffered arrangement, because if he had refused, he would have lost the right to seek reimbursement of the over $1 million in legal costs he had incurred in the course of the two year investigation. tive indictment, like other "protective" motions, secures the right to take an action, such as seeking an indictment, at a later date. Protective indictments are used infrequently and are generally appropriate only in time-sensitive cases, such as those involving a fugitive witness or complex foreign evidence. A motion for an indictment, protective or otherwise, is improper under the guidelines for federal prosecutors without a reasonable assurance for obtaining a conviction. Id. 277 Id. 278 Id. Pursuant to § 593(0(1) of the Act, subjects of an independent counsel's probe are only eligible for reimbursement of legal fees if no indictment is filed against them:
[U]pon the request of an individual who is the subject of an investigation conducted by an independent counsel pursuant to this chapter, the division of the court may, if no indictment is brought against such individual pursuant to that investigation, award reimbursement for those reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by that individual during that investigation which would not have been incurred but for the requirements of this chapter. Furthermore, the potential for precisely this abusive maneuver had been recognized at the time the Ethics in Government Act was being formulated. In the final report of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force in 1975, Associate Special Prosecutor Henry Ruth wrote that it would be "irresponsible and unethical for a prosecutor to issue a report suggesting criminal conduct on the part of someone" who was not to be indicted. 28 It can be argued that the law is unfair because, by giving special prosecutors unlimited budgets and staffs, it encourages them to pursue an investigation when a normal prosecutor would not. 28 Especially in a case involving a high government official, the pressure to make [public] statements will be great. A prosecutor's public statements can have a profound impact on an individual's reputation, Moreover, the harm that an alleged suspect suffers from such publicity will often persist no matter how completely the individual is exonerated. Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith, supra note 260, at 5. 287 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Act specifies that the Department of Justice "shall," upon request, provide an independent counsel with "the resources and personnel necessary to perform such independent counsel's duties." 28 U.S.C. 594(d). As noted in the ex-Attorneys General amicus brief:
ancing of conflicting interests is not carried out by the independent counsel, opening the way for loss of prosecutorial perspective and for overzealous pursuit. This freedom from budgetary constraints has permitted many counsel to adopt a "scorched earth" approach, in which no evidence is too remote or too trivial to merit inquiry. 2 91 Furthermore, as the cost of an investigation mounts, an independent counsel may be caught in a "vicious circle" in which further investigation is pursued primarily in response to pressure to justify the undertaking of the probe in the first Thus, the Independent Counsel can requisition a team of law enforcement officers who have no competing responsibilities. In all of these ways, the Independent Counsel essentially escapes the condition that shapes the environment of every other prosecutor-the need to determine and reassess priorities in a setting characterized by competing interests and demands. Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith, supra note 260, at 11. The investigation of Oliver North, John Poindexter, and Albert Hakim by Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh most clearly demonstrates the use of unlimited resources. A team of 29 lawyers, 73 administrative staff members, six agents from the Customs Department, eleven agents from the Internal Revenue Service, and 35 agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been assembled to carry out the investigation. After less than one year of operation, Walsh and this staff had conducted over 1000 witness interviews. In that same time period, the investigation had spent more than $4.7 million, not including the salaries of the agents of the Customs Department, IRS and FBI. By comparison to these investigations, the entire Public Integrity Section of DOJ, which investigates and prosecutes cases against federal officials nationwide, operates on an annual budget of $2.35 million. place. 292 With normal budgetary concerns and policy priorities, a typical federal prosecutor might have declined to commit resources to such cases which failed to produce indictments.
In the most highly publicized independent counsel investigation, that of Oliver North, John Poindexter, and Albert Hakim by Lawrence Walsh, questions have been raised regarding the possible use of North's testimony before Congress against him in a judicial proceeding. 293 The three defendants were compelled to testify before Congress regarding their roles in the Iran-Contra scandal. 29 4 Defense lawyers in the case have argued that Walsh, his staff, and the grand jury which brought the charges may have been "tainted" by the evidence disclosed at the congressional hearings, so that, in effect, the government compelled North and others to testify against themselves, thereby violating their privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment. 2 95 Although a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently ruled against North and his co-defendants' interlocutory motion to dismiss, it based its holding on the limitation of an appellate court's jurisdiction to final decisions of the district courts. 29 6 Thus, the court allowed that the "[a]ppellants may ultimately be correct in their assertion that if the grand jury's probable cause determination was 'tainted' by the use of immunized testimony, dismissal of the indictment will be required to remedy the harm. ' 29 7 In any event, Walsh's ability to pursue the case without violating the fifth amendment rights of the defendants is unresolved. the necessary haggling, frictional process of dispute resolution in a government formed of ambitious, competing branches. However, Congress' persistence after the original matter in contention had been resolved showed the utility of the independent counsel mechanism as a wieldy tool for the harrassment of the Executive Branch.
2
In light of the abuses associated with the Act, its refinement seems essential. 313 Although an attack on the Act on constitutional grounds is, at this point, quixotic, alternatives for worthwhile amendments to the Act are possible. 3 14 For example, an appropriate refinement could be the deletion of the requirement of a filed report in situations in which the independent counsel concludes his or her investigation without an indictment. However, methods for achieving an increased accountability for independent counsels are more difficult to devise. The most effective method of guarding against prosecutorial abuses is through the political accountability of the unitary Executive, which is, of course, absent from the independent counsel process. Without the accountability that comes from the clear delineation of responsibility for the exercise of prosecutorial power, abuses will continue. 313 As Justice Scalia noted, however, both the political cosmetics and utility of the independent counsel provision may cause Congress to leave the Act untouched:
[Ilt is difficult to vote not to enact, and even more difficult to vote to repeal, a statute called ... A direct, bitter confrontation between the President and Congress formed the backdrop to the investigation of appellee Olson and the independent counsel mechanism must be viewed within the context of this interbranch struggle if a consideration of its constitutional validity is to be complete. There is irony in the fact that an Act originally intended to separate politics from the administration of justice instead has now been easily, albeit subtly, transformed into a means of initiating criminal prosecution for political purposes. Because the majority pretermitted this political content to the Morrison case, such a subversion of the independent counsel mechanism was not examined. The majority's opinion considered only the technical, formal aspects of the independent counsel provision in determining that it conformed with constitutional restrictions and did not upset the balance of power among the branches of government. However, as Justice Scalia recognized, and events have demonstrated, the actual implementation of the provision presents a substantial intrusion into the responsibilities of the President, as well as encouraging the use of questionable prosecutorial tactics.
The authority to undertake a criminal investigation in pursuit of an indictment carries the potential for abusive treatment of those individuals who become subject to such investigations, even if the authority is exercised in good faith. By placing responsibility for this function solely within the boundaries of the Executive Branch, accountability for its exercise is achieved because the head of that branch must be able to justify any excessive or uneven enforcement or pay the price in the loss of political esteem. Because, as Justice Scalia noted, an independent counsel is subordinate to no one when operating within the confines of his or her established jurisdiction, there is little to temper his or her pursuit of an indictment.
17
Although overly aggressive prosecution by a typical United States Attorney is not unheard of, under the Ethics in Government Act, the single-focus prosecutor, who possesses a natural susceptibility for overzealous investigation, is institutionalized. Thus, abuses in prosecutorial discretion will arise more regularly and more frequently. Although legislative refinement of the independent counsel provision may curb future prosecutorial excesses, the most 316 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 317 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
